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ABSTRACT
Virtualization technology adds great opportunities and chal-
lenges to the cloud computing paradigm. Resource manage-
ment can be efficiently enhanced by employing Live Virtual
Machine Migration (LVMM) techniques. Based on the lit-
erature of LVMM implementation in the virtualization en-
vironment, middle-boxes such as firewalls do not work ef-
fectively after LVMM as it introduces dynamic changes in
network status and traffic, which may lead to critical secu-
rity vulnerabilities. One key security hole is that the security
context of the firewall do not move with the Virtual Machine
after LVMM is triggered. This leads to inconsistency in the
firewall level of protection of the migrated Virtual Machine.
There is a lack in the literature of practical studies that
address this problem in cloud computing platform. This
paper demonstrates a practical analysis using OpenStack
testbed to study the firewalls limitations in protecting vir-
tual machines after LVMM. Two network scenarios are used
to evaluate this problem. The results show that the security
context problem does not exist in the stateless firewall but
can exist in the stateful firewall.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection, firewall; C.2.1
[Network Architecture and Design]: Distributed net-
works
Keywords
cloud computing, live migration, firewall, OpenStack
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing paradigm introduces an efficient utili-
sation of huge computing resources among multiple users
with minimal expense and deployment effort compared to
traditional computing facilities. However, since cloud com-
puting has emerged from a business perspective, it has faced
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the challenges of standardisation and compatibility[1]. Al-
though cloud computing has incredible benefits, some gov-
ernments and enterprises are hesitating to transfer their
computing technology to the cloud as a consequence of se-
curity challenges. Security is, therefore, a significant factor
in motivating the cloud computing adoption. Cloud services
consist of three layers: Software as a Service (SaaS), Plat-
form as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS). IaaS is the bottom layer where all the other layers,
PaaS and SaaS are built on it. Technical security challenges
emerge in different layers, but the focus of this paper is on
IaaS. [2, 3, 4]
Since cloud computing infrastructure has the features of
rapid elasticity and fast resource pooling, its services and
processes are built on virtualization technology, which sup-
ports these features. One of the main core management pro-
cesses in IaaS are Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and
VM migration, which are parts of virtualization technology
[5]. There are two types of VM migration: live VM migra-
tion and non-live VM migration [6] . This paper focuses
on live VM migration as it has significant advantages, such
as enhancement of the performance of High Computing Per-
formance (HCP)[7], minimising the downtime for the system
with minimum human interaction[8], server consolidation in
order to avoid sprawl, balancing workloads between phys-
ical machines to avoid large discrepancies among physical
machines and mitigating hot spots when extra resources are
needed [9].
Live Virtual Machine Migration (LVMM) is a technique
that allows Virtual Machines to be moved at run-time be-
tween physical machines without interrupting their processes.
However, LVMM utilisation has been restricted, as it entails
security consequences. One major security vulnerability is
that the security context of the VM does not move with it
after migration. Therefore, the VM will not be protected by
the firewall rules that were being set before migration took
place. This reduces the efficiency of the firewalls and may
allow unauthorised parties to access the VM.
This paper investigates this security problem by exam-
ining the behavior of the firewall before and after LVMM
triggered in a cloud, as this problem has a lack of practical
exploration in the literature in a cloud-based environment.
This paper is organised as follows: an overview of the
work related to LVMM security holes is illustrated in Sec-
tion2. Section3 examines the firewall consistency during live
virtual machine migration. Section 4 contains the Discus-
sion section. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions from
this paper and future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
There are two main categories of LVMM security vulner-
abilities that have been identified in the literature. The first
vulnerability is through a hole where the attackers can at-
tack the VM running on the cloud system [10, 11, 12], since
LVMM protocol transfer data in plaintext through network
links. As a result, LVMM can be penetrated practically via
man-in-the-middle attack [13, 14]. The second vulnerability
is due to dynamic VM network state transfer, which affects
transferring the security context with the VM after LVMM.
The second category is the focus of this paper, as it faces a
lack of practical investigation where the first category will
be under examination for future work.
Security context consistency has been studied by [15] who
presented a LVMM framework using NSE-H (Network Se-
curity Enabled Hypervisor) and built a prototype based on
a stateful firewall in Xen hypervisor. As well, by [16] who
implemented a framework using Java to migrate the security
state along with the VM during LVMM in Linux with KVM
hypervisor. However, their experiments did not run on IaaS
platform.
Based on structural congruence and a reduction relation,
[17] presented an algebraic framework named Cloud Calcu-
lus, which can help to design a topology of cloud computing
with a firewall, where the security policies can be specified
along with LVMM. Verification of this method was accom-
plished by translating the firewall configuration into CSP
syntax and using Sugar SAT-solver [18]. However, this pro-
posed work aims to verify the consistency of sets of firewall
rules but does not aim to maintain a firewall configuration
after LVMM takes place.
An analytical experiment in a real cloud, done by [19] in
2013, shows that there is a time interval where LVMM is not
under firewall protection, but this study does not investigate
the security context movement. An analysis of the virtual
machine migration published by [20] which points out that
the root security problem in LVMM is due to the change
of IP address after migration leads to inconsistency of IP
address which is configured in the firewall and IPS. However,
the methodology used in setting up the experiment did not
involve a cloud environment.
According to our best knowledge and investigation of the
literature, the problem of firewall security policy consistency
in VMs after the LVMM process is enabled in cloud comput-
ing has not been in a cloud environment . Therefore, this
paper aims to investigate this problem in a cloud environ-
ment based on OpenStack cloud.
3. OPENSTACK IAAS CLOUD
In this section, an overview of OpenStack deployment has
been illustrated and the used network topology has been
presented. The main two components in this paper are the
firewall and the Live Virtual Machine Migration. They have
been defined and their configuration has been introduced
within the scope of this paper.
3.1 OpenStack test-bed deployment
OpenStack is an open source cloud computing platform
project that offers IaaS. OpenStack has been selected as the
experiment platform in this paper because it has a very sup-
portive community of both academic researchers and com-
mercial bodies
In this paper, Ubuntu 14.04 is used as an operating system
(OS) for all nodes as Ubuntu supports OpenStack cloud.
Juno OpenStack release has been used to install the required
packages for this cloud platform which consists of Controller
node, Network node and Compute node. Figure1 shows the
opentStack services installed on each node.
Network node runs basic networking services which are
DHCP Agent to provide DHCP service, L3 agent to provide
routing service, L2 agent to provide virtual switching ser-
vice and neutron-plugin-openvswitch-agent to provide open-
Vswitch service.
Controller node is managing cloud infrastructure as it
runs several services to manage the communication between
different OpenStack cloud components via nova-api; where
Keystone is managing authorization and authentication for
services and users on this platform. Horizon is used to imple-
ment a dashboard that used to control most of the cloud op-
erations via a web-based interface. Moreover, the controller
is holding the network server configuration which installed
via Neutron server service. Glance is used for managing
operating system images that used during VM creation.
The main role for Compute nodes is to host virtual ma-
chines (VM) which are created on the cloud system using
Nove-Compute. Compute nodes run as well L2 agent and
neutron-plugin-openvswitch-agent in order to manage net-
work connections between VMs[21]. The Controller is con-
figured to have an extra role so it can also operate as a
Compute node since there is a need to have two Compute
nodes in order to implement LVMM.
The hardware specification for each physical server used
in the experiments is 16GB RAM, 300GB hard disk,two net-
work cards and Intel Core i5-4460 CPU@3.2GHz ×4.
Figure 1: Openstack services for each node
3.2 Network Topology
Networking in OpenStack uses either Nova-network or
Neutron Network, which are types of SDN (Software De-
fined Network). Neutron is more flexible as it allows plug-in
components such as OpenFlow and firewalls. Moreover, it is
newer than nova-network; however, it is more complex [21].
As a first stage, a simple single flat network was configured,
which consists of two networks: a Management Network
used to manage the OpenStack components on the admin-
istration side, and a Data Network used to exchange data
between VM (Virtual Machines). In terms of network de-
vices, one physical router-switch is used and one eight-port
switch. Moreover, OVS (Open vSwitch) is another compo-
nent of the SDN network.
The Management Network is used by the physical nodes
for system control and management of traffic, whereas the
Data Network is specifically for VM traffic only. This topol-
ogy was configured using the Neutron Network service, and
the networking component was installed on each node ac-
cording to its functions as illustrated in Figure 2.
• Controller Node has a Neutron server configuration
• Compute Node has Layer2 agent, Open vSwitch agent
• Network Node has a DHCP agent, Lear3 agent, Meta-
data agent and Open vSwitch agent.
In this experimental setting, the Controller Node acts as
Controller and Compute2, therefore, it has the Compute
Node network configuration as well.
Figure 2: Network connection between the Experi-
ment servers
3.3 Firewall configuration
The Firewall task is to inspects the network packets and
decide to allow them to pass or drop them based on pre-
defined rules[22]. Based on how a decision is made for ev-
ery packet, firewalls are categorised into stateless firewalls
and stateful firewalls. If a firewall decides the fate of every
packet solely by examining the packet itself, then the fire-
wall is called a stateless firewall. If a firewall decides the fate
of some packets not only by examining the packet itself, but
also by examining the packets that the firewall has accepted
previously, then the firewall is called a stateful firewall [23].
An iptables firewall is used for the testing. Virtual fire-
walls are preferable to traditional firewalls in cloud comput-
ing. Traditional firewall placement is not sufficient in cloud
computing, as it will introduce traffic overhead to the net-
work switches and hypervisors [24].
3.4 LVMM technique implementation
The ideal migration process is to copy the complete state
of VM, including memory, disk and network connection [8].
There is a default LVMM algorithm in the most popular
VMM such as Xen, VMWare and KVM. In order to migrate
memory state; there are two mechanisms which are pre-copy
and post-copy as compared by [25] In [26] illustrate the Se-
quential steps of the Xen default VM live migration algo-
rithm as displayed in Figure 3. This algorithm is based in
transferring the run-time memory state of the VM.
Figure 3: Xen LVMM algorithm
Three methods can be used to implement LVMM in Open-
Stack: shared storage live migration that requires a shared
storage system to be configured such as NFS, block live mi-
gration or volume-backed live migration that requires to in-
stall and configure an extra OpenStack service called cinder.
In this experiment, block live migration is implemented as it
meets the scope of this paper. It does not use a shared folder
between the Compute nodes to store VMs and does not re-
quire an extra service to be installed LVMM is disabled by
default in OpenStack, as it incurs security vulnerabilities. It
is, therefore, required to configure the nova.conf files of the
Compute nodes to enable live migration flag. It has been no-
ticed that the CPU version on the nodes can affect LVMM
process where the VM can not be migrated from a compute
node that has a lower CPU version to another compute node
that has a higher CPU version. Moreover, Libvirt has to be
configured to listen for unsecured TCP connections. It is ob-
vious from these configurations, that some security holes are
opened in order to enable LVMM; however, these particular
security aspects are under investigation.[21]
4. EXPERIMENT
In these experiments, two physical networks are created.
The first network for management and used for control plane
traffic. The second network for Data and used by VMs to
communicate with each other. LVMM traffic takes place
on Data network. In order to perform LVMM, two compute
nodes are set-up. For testing purposes, three VMs have been
launched: one in Compute1 and two in Compute2 as shown
in Table 1. All VMs are in the same subnet of Data network.
Table 1: Scenario1: VMs locations
VM name IP location
vmtest1 19.168.1.33/24 Compute2
vmtest2 192.168.1.34/24 Compute1
vmtest3 192.168.1.35/24 Compute2
Problem definition. VM gets a dynamic IP address
from a DHCP server, therefore, it is more likely that VM
gets a different IP address when it shut down and/or DHCP
leased line expired. In LVMM process, there is a period of
time where the VM is not seen in the network link called
down-time interval. Therefore, VM might get a different IP
address after the migration process is completed.
Hypothesis. If LVMM is triggered, then VM IP address
might change which affect the firewall rules consistency as
firewall uses a static IP address to create its rules
Scenario no.1: Testing IP address Consistency.
The aim of this scenario is to analysis if the VMaˆA˘Z´s IP
address might change after live migration take place since
VM got dynamic IPs from DHCP server.
DHCP leased line has been set to be one hour in order to
allow it to expire during the LVMM process. The experiment
in this scenario has been repeated once on a weekly basis for
two months. The VM has been restarted many times due to
LVMM down-time interval. Table 2 shows a code written on
Ubuntu that used to repeat live migration process ten times
per week.
Table 2: code to repeat LVMM
for (( i=1; i <= 5 ; i++ ))
do
nova live-migration –block-migrate 58aabbea-e309-
4988-9b9e-fec99bb1a69a compute1
sleep 3m
nova show 58aabbea-e309-4988-9b9e-fec99bb1a69a |
grep hypervisor
sleep 1m
nova live-migration –block-migrate 58aabbea-e309-
4988-9b9e-fec99bb1a69a controller sleep 3m nova
show 58aabbea-e309-4988-9b9e-fec99bb1a69a | grep
hypervisor
sleep 1m
done
Results. The results show that the VM IP did not change;
even though the DHCP leased line expiration duration is due
to. It has been found that most hypervisors make use of the
ARP protocol in order to allow VM to keep their IP address
after migration which agrees with the results obtained in [27,
28, 29]. While these results contradict with the methodology
used in [20] where the authors assume that shutting down
VM can mimic LVMM process and allow VMs to change
their IP address which affects the security consistency of
IPS and IDS systems.
Scenario no.2 : Testing Stateless Firewall Rules
Consistency. This scenario has been conducted into two
different network topologies. The first topology, all the VMs
are on the same LAN. The second topology, the VMs sepa-
rated into two VLANs. The aim of this setting is to study
if the network topology introduces any effects on the state-
less firewall consistency as VLAN introduce logical network
isolation.
OpenStack platform uses a security group mechanism to
set security rules and then neutron saves the rules in ipta-
bles. In this experiment, two basic rules are configured for
verification purposes. The first rule restricts the incoming
ICMP echo requests sent to a specific VM as illustrated in
Table 3. The second rule restricts incoming TCP request
through an ssh connection as illustrated in Table 4.
Table 3: firewall rule no.1
#iptables -A INPUT -p icmp –icmp-type echo-
request s 192.168.1.33 -d 192.168.1.35 m state –state
NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j DROP
The first part of this scenario is to trigger LVMM while
all VMs in the same LAN. The second part of this scenario,
two VLANs.
Results. The results of this scenario illustrate that the
stateless firewall rules were valid before and after live migra-
Table 4: firewall rule no.2
#iptables -A INPUT -p –tcp -d 192.168.1.33 –s
192.168.1.34 dport 22 -j DROP
tion regardless if the VMs are all in one LAN or separated
into different VLANs.Finding. The results of scenario no.1
and scenario no.2 show that the Hypothesis. is not valid.
Live Virtual Machine Migration did not contribute in chang-
ing the VM IP address. As a consequence, stateless firewall
consistency has not been affected.
5. DISCUSSION
Based on the experiments which involve configuration of
two different security rules on two different network topolo-
gies, it has been found that the security context set on VM
according to the stateless firewall rules are valid even after
live virtual machine migration is triggered.
This experimental investigation leads to a critical analysis
of various aspects in enhancing security of LVMM in cloud
computing involving firewall as demonstrated below
• The security context consistency problem exists in the
stateful firewall as has been explored by [30] as only
packets matching a known connection state are allowed
to go through the firewall. However, the proposed so-
lution is based on a specific type of virtual firewalls
which is vShield.
• A major network security risk in cloud computing is
due to the limits of traditional firewall connections [31].
Moreover, traditional firewall settings are not sufficient
for optimal fine-grained decisions, and application-level
firewalls are not able to deal with dynamically opened
server ports for encrypted connections [32]. In addi-
tion [30] explained the reasons for blind spots which
are not covered by traditional security appliances and
show that traditional firewalls cannot protect cloud
traffic. Moreover, they point out that virtual firewalls
can overcome this limitation.
• The most critical point is that security group tech-
nique is used by IaaS cloud to set the firewall security
rules, but it lacks to many features that are provided
by traditional firewalls [33] and make the firewall con-
figuration more complex and trickier [34]. As well as
it is a type of stateless firewall which does not support
high dynamic environment such as cloud [30]. How-
ever, replacing stateless firewall with stateful firewall
introduce the security context consistency problem. In
fact, stateful firewall is still an open problem [35]
Therefore, the following aspects require further practical
investigation in the cloud environment:
• In a context of the stateful firewall; the security con-
text configured for VM is not moving with the cor-
responding VM after LVMM is triggered even though
all VMs are located on the same LAN. That leads to
nullifying the configured security policies.
• Live migration effects on QoS when security mecha-
nisms are implemented to mitigate security holes opened
during LVMM configuration.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, a firewall exploration has been studied to
evaluate its security context during Live Virtual Machine
migration. This security context was configured via a state-
less firewall and the experiment was conducted on a cloud
computing platform deployed using OpenStack. This exper-
iment has shown that the authorization rules configured in
a stateless firewall to protect access to VMs are consistent,
even after Live Virtual Machine Migration (LVMM) is trig-
gered. However, in cloud IaaS, the stateless firewall in the
form of security group faces several limitations as it is com-
plex to configure and it is considered as a type of traditional
firewalls. Therefore, the proper type of firewall has a great
impact on preserving security and maintaining the cloud re-
source management flexibility. This experimental evaluation
in cloud testbed is a step in investigating the security chal-
lenges in LVMM in order to provide a practical and visible
mitigation. Future work is planned to enhance the security
of inter-communication in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
during Live Virtual Machine Migration(LVMM) when the
stateful firewall is configured.
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